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Abstract Burundi, a landlocked East Central African nation has been prominent for the most part, for the 
wrong reasons –ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. Since independence in 1962, the country has moved from 
one incidence of massacre of its own citizens to another-in 1965, 1969, 1972,1988,1991,1993 up to 2015. 
Efforts made to ensure inter-ethnic cooperation and harmony-the Arusha Peace Agreement does not seem to 
work as it appears to be working for its ethnic kin, and regional ally-Rwanda to the north. What are the 
peculiarities (if any) of the Burundian society that can be identified as being responsible for this state of 
affairs? In situating the country within the pluralistic political ethos of the New World Order, it may be 
argued that ethnic conflict appears to have been accentuated by the demands of that order. Using the 
instrumentalist model in the analysis of ethnic conflict in plural African societies, this paper seeks to 
determine the legacies left behind by the culture of conflict and its possible prognostic course for the 
building of a virile and stable society in a globalized 21st century international system. 
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Introduction 
The aphorism “culture of conflict” is alien to 
indigenous African societies. Though conflict was, 
and is still inevitable at various levels of human 
relationship in society, in pre-colonial Africa, 
mechanisms existed for its amelioration, even 
outright avoidance, such that the tendency for it to 
become a culture or way of life of the people was 
effectively arrested.  
In Burundi, or what was originally known as 
Ruanda-Urundi Kingdom the mechanisms for pre-
colonial inter-group harmony was predicated more 
or less on a rigorous application and adherence to 
societal norms. With the onset of the colonial 
phase, those rules or norms were either allowed to 
decay or deliberately destroyed, so as to give way 
to new, colonially – induced social system that was 
alien to the people.  It was this social system that 
gave rise to the so-called “culture of conflict” that 
still prevails to this day or so it seems.  To 
understand the origins and dynamics of the conflict 
that now define Burundi society in contemporary 
times, it may be necessary to look at the pre-
colonial society for a background. 
Pre-Colonial Burundi: 
An analysis of pre-colonial political and social 
structures of Burundi is essentially a focus on 
traditional Burundi society on the aspects 
mentioned above. From very ancient days, or at 
any rate, since the founding of the monarchy at the 
end of the 17
th
 century
(1)
, Burundi population was 
made up of four components – “amoko”. These 
included the Ganwa, the Hutu, the Tutsi and the 
Twa.
(2)
 The groups have shared the same language 
– Kirundi, and culture, worshipped the same god-
Imana, obeyed orders from the same ruler or king – 
Mwami; and occupied, and still occupy the same 
geographic space. It is on these grounds that one 
wonders whether they can appropriately be 
described as ethnic groups.  The Hutus’ and the 
‘Tutsis’(3) are the main groups. Being agricultural 
and pastoral peoples respectively, they lived, and 
still live together in habitats dispersed on hillsides 
throughout the country. They maintained very close 
relationships through barter trade in all types of 
products. Other links were based on marriages – 
“Ubukwe; distribution of presents – ‘ingemu’, beer 
drinking sessions – ‘ubutumire’,  and mutual aid -, 
‘Ikibiri’.(4) 
The population was structured around about 220 
clans, and dispersed throughout the country and 
even outside it.  They were organized in levels: at 
the first, there is the house – ‘inzu’, composed of 
members of the nuclear family, the second is the 
lineage – Umur’yango’, composed of descendants 
of the same ancestor, and third is the clan,
(5)
 whose 
members recognize each other by name, but may 
not know each other because of their geographical 
dispersal, as we indicated earlier.  This dispersal of 
clans is actually a common feature of African 
societies of the Great Lakes – a background to the 
irrenditist feature and characteristics of ethnic 
conflict in the area; as we shall soon see. Some 
instances may help to prove the point made. The 
Bega are found both in Rwanda and Burundi, as 
well as the Bushi, in Eastern Zaire – Congo DRC. 
The Bajiji, the Bashambo and the Bacyaba are 
many in Burundi, Buha and Buhaya in Western 
Tanzania. 
Names of certain clans also give an inkling of their 
places of origin – the Banyar wanda- Rwanda, the 
Banyabugfi – Bugufi, the Banyagisaka – Gisaka, 
the Buyugoma – Buyugoma, the Buha – Buha etc. 
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Others are directly attached to a famous historical 
personality. For example, the Bakando, Bavuna and 
Bavu bikiro identity with Ntare Rushatsi, founder 
of the Burundi monarchy, whereas E. Mworoha 
identifies the Bahanza and the Bashubi as 
exclusively Hutu, the Bategwa are particular to the 
Tutsi, the Banyoni particular to the Twa, the 
Barongo and the Banyagisaka common to Hutu and 
Tutsi, and the Barima found in the three 
aforementioned categories.
(6)
 The Ganwa are 
subdivided into four lineages – Butare, Bezi, 
Batage and Bamhbatsa, all descendants of the 
founder of the Burundi monarchy. They are 
perfectly separated in terms of identity between 
aristocracy and clan.
(7)
 
As a social institution, the clan appears to have 
preceded the emergence of great monarchies in the 
Great Lakes region of Africa. Owing largely to 
their widespread and spatial distribution within the 
various kingdoms of Africa of the Great Lakes, the 
clan institution is still one of the basic elements of 
social organization in Burundi. It is observed that 
on occasions Burundians identity themselves not in 
terms of their ‘ethnic’ origins, but on the basis of 
their clan belongings.  
On purely political basis, pre-colonial political 
organization was characterized by the existence of 
a territorial space over which a king exercised 
power. The king extended his power through 
authorities at the head of administrative sub-
divisions. These authorities comprised of chiefs 
who were appointed and dismissed at the discretion 
of the sovereign the ‘mwami’ who was at the top of 
the hierarchy of kingly power.  
Under the administrative sub-divisions over which 
the Chief exercised power, were sub-chieftaincies. 
These were administered by sub-chiefs who were 
appointed and dismissed by the chief. The sub-
chiefs were comprised of both Tutsi and Hutu 
ethnicities. The chieftaincies that varied in size, and 
sometimes located in distinct geographical 
segments, were often administered by a Chief of 
royal lineage – Ganwa. At other times, however, 
such rulers may well come from more humble Hutu 
or Tutsi families that had distinguished themselves 
through devotion to the monarchy, and the national 
cause. 
The king (Mwami) sparingly intervened in the 
running of the chieftaincies, making the chiefs to 
enjoy great autonomy but for the obligation of 
paying tribute in kind or in labour, as dictated by 
custom. To the contrary, the sub-chief who 
administered the sub-chieftaincies, were more 
strictly monitored and controlled by the chiefs who 
appointed them. A major peculiarity of the pre-
colonial chieftaincies in Burundi was the unstable 
nature of their borders.  This was due to the 
sporadic conflicts between and among chiefs in 
their bid to expand their chieftaincies and sub-
chieftaincies.  Due largely to this situation, the 
territorial sub-divisions over which a chief ruled 
were not designated as geographical entities, 
instead, the governing chief was used to indicate 
the geographical origin of a person.  Thus, the hill, 
the chief and the region were some of the 
references used by people to determine their 
administrative identities. 
The pre-colonial state in Burundi manifested a 
characteristic feature of a nation, rather in tune with 
Benedict Andersons imagined communities 
thesis”.(8) It was composed of human groupings in 
which individual were united with one another 
through material and spiritual relations, and being 
themselves different from individuals of other 
national groupings.
(9)
 
There was also the Ubushingantahe institution. In 
Burundi tradition, this was open only to persons 
recognized for their integrity and ability to 
managing conflict over and beyond all partisan 
tendencies. Such persons were co-opted by the 
communities at the grassroots level to represent 
them at the higher levels, those of the sub-chiefs, 
chiefs and the King. These authorities had no 
power to divest them of their prerogatives since 
they did not appoint them. Only the grassroots of 
the communities who bestowed power on them had 
the right to punish them in the event of serious 
faults or unworthy social or moral conduct. Such 
were the intricacies of the pre-colonial Burundi 
society that made for social harmony rather than ‘a 
culture of conflict’. A brief look at the colonial era 
will reveal both a legacy and a prognosis of 
conflict. 
Colonial Burundi: 1889 – 1962 
Much as we do not have space to delve so much 
into the history of colonial Burundi, nor do we 
have need for that,
(10)
 it is imperative that we state 
the outlines to enable us appreciate the movement 
of social forces that have culminated in the conflict 
we see today. We need an understanding of the 
rough outlines of power relations in Burundi in the 
period leading up to, and culminating in the eclipse 
of colonial power in 1962. 
At the onset of colonial rule by the Germans in 
1889, the monarchy had become well established.  
It had become both a focus of popular loyalty, and 
a major symbol of social protest. This was because 
on the eve of colonial rule in Burundi, the struggle 
for power was between the new Mwamni, Mwezi 
Gisabo and his newly entrenched elder brothers 
collectively known as the Batare – Sons of Ntare 
(founder of the Burundi monarchy). From around 
1860 to 1908, when he died, Mwezi attempted to 
evict his Batare brothers and nephews from their 
domain and replace them with his own sons – the 
Bezi or descendants of Mwezi. So during this 
general period, Burundi was fragmented into four 
distinct spheres of political influence – (1) the 
eastern region approximately one third of the 
country was under the control of Batare Princes, (2) 
the core area of the Kingdom, in and around the 
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royal capital of Muramvya was under the direct 
control of Mwami Mwezi Gisabo, (3) forming some 
kind of buffer zone between this core area and the 
Batare – controlled east were the domains of 
Mwezi’s sons, the Bezi Princes; while (4) an 
elongated stripe of territory running on a north – 
south axis along Lake Tanganyika and the Ruziz 
River were various semi-independent Chiefdoms 
under Hutu or Tutsi control. 
(11)
 It is observed that 
the conflict that accompanied Mwezi’s reign rarely, 
if ever, had anything to do with a straight Hutu-
Tutsi opposition.  The struggle for power was 
among the Ganwa. This marked a major difference 
between the pre-colonial and indeed colonial 
histories of Burundi and Rwanda. Whereas in 
Rwanda, the north-ward expansion of the kingdom 
at the turn of the century involved a head-on 
confrontation with pre-existing Hutu kingdoms, in 
Burundi, by contrast, the competitive struggle 
among princes required them not only to solicit, but 
maximize their support among both Hutu and 
Tutsi. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, 
for the coming Hutu-Tutsi conflict, the kingship in 
Burundi was never identified with Tutsi 
supremacy.
 (12)
 
Things began to change markedly from 1929. In 
what it conceived as bringing about administrative 
efficiency, the Belgian authorities brought on a 
policy that was aimed at bringing together a 
number of previously independent chielfdoms 
under the authority of an influential ganwa, so as to 
consolidate smaller holdings into large territorial 
and administrative entities. In pursuit of this policy, 
between 1929 and 1933, the number of ‘chefferies’ 
(chiefdoms) dropped from 133 to 46, and to 35 by 
1945.
(13)
 
More significant were the changes that occurred 
pursuant to these reforms on the ethnic identity of 
office holders. As Joseph Gahama has indicated, 
few Hutu incumbents survived the 1929 reforms, as 
their number dropped from 27 on the eve of the 
reforms to 3 in 1933, and by 1945 all had 
disappeared.
(14)
 Though the reforms swept a great 
amount and number of those offices and 
officeholders away, but of the 10 that remained by 
1945, all were held by Tutsi. See table 1. 
Table 1:  Ethnic Background of incumbent 
Chiefs, 1929 – 1945. 
Yea
r 
Numb
er 
Bata
re 
Be
zi 
Tut
si 
Hut
u 
192
9 
133 41 35 30 27 
193
3 
46 16 20 7 3 
193
7 
44 15 20 8 1 
194
5 
35 8 17 10 0 
Source: Joseph Gahama, le Burundi sous 
administration belge (Paris, Karthala, 1983),  104 
in Lemarchand, p. 44. 
While we may not explain the outcome of this 
colonial policy as ostensibly targeted against the 
Hutu as an ethnic category, as there was general 
social unrest against aspects of the so-called social 
reforms of the colonialists, a look at the socio-
ideological bent of the Europeans with regard to 
the ethnography of the Great Lakes peoples may be 
instructive.  
It is well – established in the literature(15) that 
missionary and colonial historiography or what 
may be more appropriately referred to as colonial 
anthropology classified the Burundi population into 
‘races’ and ‘castes’. It made a clear-cut distinction 
between what it called Hamites, Bantus and 
Pyamies. The Tutsi were placed at the top of 
society, regarded as Hamite pastoralists, who came 
from the north to ‘civilize’ the Hutu, an agricultural 
population, seen to be related to Bantu speaking 
peoples. The ‘pygmoid’ Twa, whatever that meant, 
were relegated to the last rung of the social ladder, 
as the “true indigenous people of the territory”. 
As much has already been said regarding the rather 
discredited Hamitic nonsense, as we indicated 
earlier, we do not intend to spend much intellectual 
capital on it here. Suffice it however to indicate 
that it would appear to have played a significant 
part in ensuring Tutsi gains in the political reforms 
of the colonial Belgian administration of the 1930s 
and 40’s, as we saw earlier. This was in conformity 
with what came to be seen as Belgian Indirect Rule 
system in Burundi. After accepting the mandate 
over Burundi from the United Nations, the 
Belgians found themselves in some dilemma 
between two policies. While some Colonialists 
were disposed to eliminating the ruling aristocracy 
for the majority Hutu, others tended to a cultivation 
of the Ganwa and Tutsi, whose leadership qualities 
had long been extolled, courtesy of the discredited 
‘Hamitic’ Hypothesis. The controversy was 
however resolved in 1932 by the Resident 
Governor, Ryckmans. Writing in that year, he 
declared: 
The Batutsi were born to 
rule. Their mere 
appearance already gives 
them considerable 
prestige over the inferior 
races that surround them. 
Their qualities and even 
their flaws dignity them 
even more.
(16)
 
Based more or less on the above declaration, which 
turned into a policy, local collaborators were to be 
recruited from among the Tutsi Chiefs. We must 
note however that Hutu/Tutsi problem in Burundi 
is neither a social nor an economic problem. As 
noted by Rutake and Gahama, it is, and has 
remained essentially a political problem of how one 
or the other ethnic group comes to, and remains in 
power.
(17)
 But the contest was not a straight 
forward affair between Hutu and Tutu in Burundi, 
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as it was in Rwanda, at the initial stages.  This 
would become clearer perhaps when we look a bit 
closely at the post war years in Burundi politics. 
 
Parties & Factions In Post War Rwanda 
The post war years in Burundi were a period of 
intense social change and rising aspirations. 
Following the heightened nationalism that began to 
sweep through colonial Africa in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, Belgium could not commit 
itself to political reforms until 10 November 1959. 
This came by way of a two-fold programme – first 
there was to be a fundamental revamping of local 
administration. The cheffeeries became provinces, 
while the ‘sous-cheffeeries’ became communes. 
The communes were headed by a bourgomaster, 
who was assisted by a popularly elected Communal 
Council. The communal council was to serve as an 
electoral college to elect members of the ‘conseil 
du pays’, upon which legislative powers were to be 
gradually devolved. The Mwami was to act as a 
constitutional monarch. 
Long before this declaration could be issued in 
November, as we noted above, several political 
parties had come into existence. Most notable of 
these were the Uprona-parti de l’Union et du 
Progress National, and the PDC – Parti Democrate 
Chretien; which identified with the Bezi and Batare 
families, respectively. The struggle between the 
Uprona and the PDC was no longer a competition 
for the control of chieftaincies, but for the capture 
of the state. 
The decisive role played by the Belgian 
administration in lending its support to the PDC 
against the Uprona is attested to by the last Vice-
Governor General of Rwanda and Burundi, Jean-
Paul Harroy. Totally reminiscent of the role of Col 
Logiest in Rwanda. Harroy admitted “an 
undienable connivance if not a complicity between 
the PDC and the tutelle”.(18) Justifying his blatant 
favouritism, Harroy charged the Uprona with a 
litany of ‘sins’ – “a radical, anti – Belgian, pro-
Lumumba, and dangerously pro-communist 
organization”. The brand of politics of the leader of 
the Uprona party, Prince Louis Rwagasore, the 
eldest son of Mwami Mwambutsa, was described 
as basically “stupid”, and his persons, equally 
stupid, conceited, spend-thrift and party-going.
(19)
 
His father, Mwami Mwambatsa did not fare any 
better in Harroy’s judgement. His “dissipated life 
and dubious frequentations”, were cited as 
irrefutable proof of his incapacity to govern. 
But by harrying Rwagasore and making him an 
advertant or inadvertent victim of Belgian 
colonialism, Harroy immeasurably added to his 
nationalist aura - a precise opposite of what was 
intended. Despite this situation rather than in spite 
of it, Rwagasore was uniquely suited to the 
political realities of his time and circumstance. As 
Lemarchand succinctly captured it: as the Mwami’s 
eldest son, he was in an ideal position to claim a 
share of the legitimacy conferred by the crown; as a  
Western educated intellectual, he was appropriately 
sensitive to the expectations of the newly emergent 
urbanized elite, as founder and president of the 
cooperative des commercants du Burundi, he had a 
wide range of strategic contact in both urban and 
rural areas, and above all, his image had a special 
appeal to the Hutu masses, since his physical look 
was much closer to the standard Hutu stereotype 
than that of either Biroli or Ntitendereza who 
paraded the distinctly aristocratic traits of their 
father, Baranyanka. Perhaps, much more 
importantly, the presumption that he took a Hutu 
girl for a wife dissipated all suspicion of ethnic 
prejudice around his person.
(20)
 Rwagasore 
appeared destined to be the man chosen by 
providence to lead Burundi back to inter group 
harmony of the pre-colonial days in the period 
following the exit of the Colonialists.  But fate 
decided otherwise! 
Having been put under House Arrest, Rwagasore’s 
political fortunes plummeted in the communal 
elections of November 1960. The PDC garnered 
942 seats out of 2876 total, and the Uprona got 
only 545. When however, Rwagasore was released 
in time for the legislative elections of September 
1961, the Uprona received approximately 80 
percent of the votes cast, with a total of 58 seats out 
of 64 available. With the Belgians all but sidelined, 
his PDC rivals defeated, Rwagasore as Prime 
Minister designate was now set to devote his 
energies to the task of governance, free from major 
opposition to his policies. But on October 13, 1961, 
as he was having dinner at a lakeside restaurant, 
Rwagasore was shot by a Greek Gunman, to be 
implicated in a PDC plot. 
Rwagasone’s death not only constituted an 
irreparable loss of leadership, but it also destroyed 
whatever measure of ethnic cohesion he had built 
into Burundi politics and society. As the legitimacy 
of his nationalist role and credentials owed little to 
constitutional niceties, but to personal qualities, 
including that of being the Mwami’s eldest son, his 
death provided a critical background to the Hutu-
Tutsi problem in post-colonial Burundi. 
The Culture Of Conflict In Post-Colonial 
Burundi, 1962 – 1993 
Rwagason’s death would appear to be the first in a 
series of crises leading inexorably to a sharp 
polarization of ethnic feelings. Other aspects of the 
crises can be gleaned from what came to be 
perceived as a crisis of confidence in the ability of 
Hutu and Tutsi elite to resist the contagion effect of 
the Rwanda Revolution of the late 1950’s and early 
1960’s.(21) There was also the aspect that 
manifested itself as a crises of authority within the 
ruling party, causing a better struggle for leadership 
of the Uprona between Tutsi and Hutu elements. 
The last, and perhaps, the most important aspect, 
was a crisis of legitimacy which culminated in the 
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abolition of the monarchy in 1966, following a 
Tutsi-led coup within the Army. These crises fed 
upon one another, until the focus of conflict shifted 
away from princely – Ganwa factionalism; and 
came to centre almost exclusively on Tutsi-Hutu 
rivalries. 
 
The so called ‘culture of conflict’ could be said to 
have set in in Burundi politics and society 
following these rivalries. It will be recalled that 
political power had for a long while remained in 
the hands of the royal family. Following the 
assassination of Prince Rwagasore, both Hutu and 
Tutsi intellectuals began to covete that power. 
Burundi’s traditional monarch, the Mwami (king) 
had remained historically popular among Hutu and 
Tutsi. Having acceded to independence on 1 July 
1962, alongside its northern ally and ethnic kin, 
Rwanda, democratic institutions were still in their 
inchoate stages in Burundi. The Mwami, 
Mwambuts IV Bangiricene established a 
constitutional monarchy, comprising equal 
numbers of Hutu and Tutsi elements. 
The king called for legislative elections in May 
1965. A Hutu Premier appointed by the king 
(Mwamit), Pierre Ngendandaumwe, was 
assassinated 3 days into his office. The fact that the 
assassin turned out to a Rwandan Tutsi refugee 
employed by the United States Embassy in 
Bujumbura, had the effect of nourishing Hutu-Tutsi 
hatred and extremism in Burundi. As if that was 
not enough outrage to the Hutu, the King 
proceeded to exasperate them the more by 
appointing a famous Ganwa of Bezi origins, and a 
long time protégé of the Court – Leopold Biha, as 
Prime Minister to replace the assassinated Hutu. 
This was in spite of the fact that the Hutu emerged 
with a solid majority of 23 out of a 33 seat National 
Assembly in the legislative elections of 1965 
referred to earlier. 
As if this once again was not enough to enrage the 
Hutu, the Court decided to reduce the number of 
communes from 18 to 78, and transform the elected 
burgomasters, the vast majority of whom were 
Hutu, to mere functionaries appointed by and 
responsible to the Mwami. As Lemarchand has 
indicated, “by making a parody of the constitution, 
and concentrating even more power around the 
throne, the Mwami thoroughly exasperated the 
Hutu elite.
(22)
 
This was the setting of the attempted coup of 19 
October 1965. In the early morning hours of that 
day, a group of Hutu army and gendarmerie 
officers drove to the Prime Ministers house, 
summoned him outside and greeted him with a 
volley of bullets, fired at point –blank range. As 
they tried to force their way into the palace, they 
met with unexpected resistance from the Mwami’s 
personal guard. The coups had failed! 
Apart from the physical elimination of the Hutu of 
any standing, ranging from the army, gendarmerie, 
politicians, even students; another immediate 
consequence of the aborted coup to the Hutu ethnic 
community in Burundi was their total loss of 
political control. As indicated by a commentator, as 
a direct consequence of the attempted coup, “power 
became the exclusive monopoly of Tutsi elements”. 
Aside the physical elimination of the entire first 
generation of Hutu leaders, one other most 
significant consequence of the abortive coup was 
the near collapse of the government machine built 
around the court. It will be recalled that in the 
midst of the chaos occasioned by the attempted 
coup, the Mwami had fled from the palace to seek 
refuge across the border in Uvira, Zaire (now 
Congo DRC). With the Mwami and his courtiers 
outside the country, the Kingdom was literally 
without a government. This was largely the 
situation until 24 March 1966, when the Mwami 
issued a royal decree from Geneva, entrusting to 
his heir apparent, Prince Charles Ndizeye, “special 
powers to coordinate and control the activities of 
the government and the secretariat of the state”.(23) 
On July 8, 1966, Ndizeye formally acceded to the 
throne under the dynastic name of Ntare III. 
Following the accession, another round of 
manouvering between the crown and the 
government ensued. Ntare proceeded to reign with 
the active support of the army. Capt-Michel 
Micombero, the representative of the army in the 
court, and who had led the royal guards that 
resisted the coupists of 1965, combined the 
functions of Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence. 
As the tug of war between the court and the 
government intensified, while attending the first 
anniversary of the coup that brought Mobutu Sese 
Seko to power in Kinshasha on November 28, 
1966, Ntare III learnt over the Radio that he has 
been deposed by the army.  The shortest reign in 
the history of the Burundi Kingdom: 8 July to 28 
November 1966 – ran its course. Capt Michel 
Micombero, who stepped in, proclaimed the First 
Republic and abolished the Monarchy.  He 
proceeded to appoint a predominantly Tutsi 
Government amid protest across the country.  
These developments, including the inexplicable 
return of Ntare III to Burundi six years later, to 
meet his death in the hands of Hima-the Tutsi sub-
group located in Southern Burundi – officers, who 
saw the return of Ntare a potential rallying point for 
the Hutu majority, led inexorably to the 1972 
genocide.     
The Hutu Rising & The 1972 Genocide 
One would have thought that Capt. Micombero 
would have been swept away alongside the 
monarchy, since he was a principal actor in Ntare’s 
reign, as indicated.  But that was not to be. What 
happened instead was that the new dispensation 
came to be referred to as “Micomberist 
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Revolution”. The Micomberist First Republic’ 
actually made strenuous effort to project a 
revolutionary image for itself. But the 
revolutionary rhetoric was dwarfed by the reality of 
a state that had few bonds of co-existence between 
Hutu and Tutsi, instead increasingly projecting an 
arena for a seemingly endless factional struggle 
among their politicians, and army men for political 
dominance. 
 
This contest took a sinister tone in 1969, when an 
unverified public disclosure of a plan of a Hutu – 
instigated coup, resulted to the execution of some 
twenty government and army personalities of Hutu 
extraction, and the imprisonment and execution of 
other scores of Hutu soldiers. These events, 
coupled with the one of 1965 convinced the Hutu 
elite that armed rebellion was about the only 
alternative to Tutsi hegemony in Burundi. It was 
this conviction that set the stage for the Hutu rising, 
and attendant genocide of 1972. 
The Hutu rising was a spontaneous outburst of 
violent hysteria unleashed by the Hutu on their 
Tutsi neighbours on 29 April 1972. A US Deputy 
Chief of Mission in Bujumbura captured the events 
thus: 
Bands of Mulelist Hutus 
entered Burundi during 
last week from Tanzania 
and started slaughter in 
Nyanza-Lac and 
particularly Rumonge, 
April 29. Troubles spread 
to Bururi where many 
soldiers at military 
training camps killed. 
Numerous reports 
suggest many officials in 
Bururi province also 
killed and that fighting 
was continuing 
throughout the province. 
We have reliable report 
Burundi armed forces 
machine gunning groups 
of insurgent from air.
(24)
 
In what was dubbed a selective genocide, the army 
and Tutsi Militia killed an estimated 100,000 
people, targeting particularly teachers, students, the 
clergy and other Hutu intellectual as well as Hutu 
soldiers.
(25)
  As the dust of the genocide settled, the 
government, the army and the civil service became 
virtually totally purged of Hutu elements. The 
prospects for an unbridled Tutsi hegemony 
appeared not just brightened, but prevalent. 
But that was how it seemed. The reality was indeed 
the opposite. The legitimacy of the seemingly 
“impregnable” Tutsi hegemony could not transcend 
the limitations inherent in the logic of minority 
rule. As noted by a commentator, the ruling class 
was now caught in a gigantic trap. As many of its 
elite got imbued with egalitarian, even 
revolutionary ideas; coups and counter coup 
became the order of the day in a post-Micomberist 
Burundi. 
Lt Col. Jean-Baptist Bagaza replaced Micombero 
as president in a coup in 1976, but he continued the 
policy of discrimination against the Hutu. Stressing 
national unity and ethnic inclusiveness, rather 
reminiscent of post-genocide Rwanda, he banned 
all references to ethnicity, as incitement to racial 
hatred. But this was a ruse, as it turned out to be an 
instrument of gagging the Hutu, and preventing 
from complaining against the discrimination they 
faced on daily basis. 
Following his other dictatorial tendencies against 
other segments of society, including the church-
about 80% of whose Missionaries were expelled, 
Bagaza was overthrown in a 1987 coup that 
brought in Major Pierre Buyoya. 
Buyoya came with a reconciliation initiative, 
appointing a Multiethnic Commission to study the 
ethic question. He also proceeded to restore normal 
relations between church and state whereupon 
many of the Missionaries expelled by Bagaza 
returned. Past violence in Burundi and Rwanda, 
involving the two ethnic communities in both 
countries – Hutu and Tutsi, complicated efforts at 
reconciliation, and made the commission largely 
ineffectual. But it marked the first attempt at state-
sponsored reconciliation of the ethnicities in 
Burundi. Others followed, and culminated in the 
Arusha Peace Agreement of 2004, that ended the 
genocide and civil war 1993 – 2005. 
How can we explain the apparent failure of these 
initiatives, especially against the background of the 
seeming effectiveness of the Arusha Accords in 
neighbouring Rwanda. We shall briefly look at the 
initiatives themselves, including the political 
setting upon which they were to operate. 
Major Buyoya, as we have seen, made the first 
move at national reconciliation. Unlike 
Micombero, with his “blissful indifference” to 
Hutu demands, Buyoya began to show some 
willingness to recognize the legitimacy of such 
demands. From this moment, Burundi entered a 
new phase in its history, one marked by a passage, 
if not yet to pluralist democracy, but at least some 
form of liberalization. For the first time in 23 years, 
the country had a government consisting of an 
equal number of Hutu and Tutsi, and headed by a 
Hutu Prime Minister. A Charter of National Unity 
was proclaimed to herald the advent of a new era 
dedicated to the construction of a society free from 
prejudice and discrimination. A new constitution 
overwhelmingly approved in a referendum, set 
specific limitations on the powers of the executive, 
stipulated the conditions of a multiparty democracy 
and enshrined the sanctity of basic human rights. 
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Further democratic credentials of the Buyoya 
regime could be gauged from the report of the 
National Commission to Study the Question of 
National Unity (1989), and the report on the 
Democratization of Institutions and Political Life 
(1991).
(26)
 While the first was an impressive Hutu – 
Tutsi effort to chart a new course towards unity, the 
second was a lengthy exploration of the meaning of 
democracy and how to democratize existing 
institutions. As events began to unfold, few 
knowledgeable observers, both within and outside 
Burundi would claim that international pressures 
were not decisive factors behind the reforms. This, 
in itself, became a major weakness of the reforms, 
as the politically conscious Hutu saw the reforms 
as virtually being forced on the government by the 
weight of international public opinion. 
In spite of this, the Buyoya regime went ahead to 
institute more reforms.  In addition to the some-
what consociational (power-sharing model), he 
went ahead to endorse, some measures articulated 
by the above mentioned National Charter on the 
Evolution, and Registration of Political Parties, Art 
57 of the new constitution notably “forbids political 
parties from identifying themselves, in form, action 
or any other manner, with any ethnicity, region, 
religion, sect or gender”. It thus prevented a party 
like Palipehutu – (Hutu political party) from 
contesting elections, much less gaining power. 
Similar restrictions were to apply in the 
organization of political parties: 
In order to be 
registered, political 
parties are obligated to 
endorse the charter of 
National Unity and… to 
proscribe interance, 
ethnicism, regionalism, 
xenophobia and 
recourse to violence in 
any form. 
(27)
 
Much as these constitutional provisions embodying 
the reforms of the Charter of National Unity were 
welcomed by a wide spectrum of the population, 
even outsiders, they did not appear to have satisfied 
all concerned. Much of the ‘give-and-take’, and 
bargaining implicit in the concept of power sharing 
was heavily mortgaged by the legacy of violence 
inherited by the Buyoya regime. A sense of 
martyrdom remained prevalently felt by those who 
suffered the most in the recurrent orgy of violence - 
the Hutu. The responsibility for the agonies they 
had endured since 1972, if not 1965, had always 
fallen squarely on the Tutsi, especially the Tutsi – 
Hima of Bururi. The Hutu felt that collective guilt 
needed to be publicly acknowledged, and some 
form of reparation made, even in the form of a 
symbolic gesture. But the Buyoya regime would 
have none of that. Consequently, while the 
mainstream Hutu population could not get 
themselves to be inspired by the gestures of 
accommodation and the pluralistic political 
programmes of the Third Republic, even as they 
played along, the hard line core of the Uprona 
political party (Mainly Tutsi party) considered 
Buyoya a sell-out, if not indeed, a “fift columnist”. 
This was the setting for the multiparty elections of 
1993 that ushered Burundi to the tragedy of that 
year. 
How and why did the tragedy unfold? A prognosis 
shall be attempted presently. This will also throw 
more light into other aspects of the Buyoya 
reforms.  It will be recalled that discussion on the 
draft charter for national unity had been organized 
at all leading levels of society, before it was 
subjected to a referendum. The referendum 
demonstrated the desire to ensure the participation 
of all citizens in a political option that was to 
guarantee democratic and progressive future for the 
country. 
When it was finally organized on 5 February 1991, 
the referendum resulted in 89. 21 percent votes for 
its adoption.
(28)
 This massive vote for the adoption 
of the charter demonstrated the determined will of 
the people, despite their reservations, to contribute 
to the struggle for the triumph of human rights, and 
the building of a peaceful society. Most significant 
was the fact that the referendum took the form of 
“greatest transparency”.(29) without the least 
manipulation, intimidation or interference by the 
authorities whatsoever. 
Details of the charter, as it concerns the rights of 
the citizens can be gleaned from Rutake and 
Gahama, cited, but its major provisions may be 
itemized here to guide informed judgement. These 
provisions include the duty to respect the 
exigencies of human dignity and the respect of 
other persons, the right of all citizens to participate 
in the running of the affairs of the state, in 
conformity with the law and for the promotion of 
national interest. The charter further provided that 
every citizen has the right to take part in political 
competition and to loyally accept that the best 
should win. 
Another significant aspect of the National Charter 
was the setting up of the constitutional 
commission, composed of men and women of all 
political sensitivities, religious beliefs and social 
categories. The institutions of the commission 
entrenched democratic ethos, gave legitimacy to 
the rights of the Burundi people to choose their 
own leaders, to control them during their terms of 
office and to ensure the application of the principle 
of alternation. The result of the commission was 
embodied in a report which was subjected to 
national debate and to the opinion of the people 
before the text of the new constitution embodying 
it was put to popular vote. 
The constitution, which once again, consecrated 
political pluralism, and respect of the legitimate 
right of the citizenry, was put to a referendum on 9 
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March 1992. It was once again adopted by an 
unprecedented 97.2 percent of votes cast. The new 
constitution thus generated a pluralist democracy 
that allowed each citizen actual participation in 
public life.  It was this constitution with such 
auspicious provisions, that the June 1993 
presidential elections took place in Burundi. 
Organized and conducted in a most transparent 
manner, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu of the 
PRODEBU political party won with 65 percent of 
the popular vote. His opponent, incumbent Pirerre 
Buyoya, came a distant second with 33 percent of 
the votes. To the delight and elation of almost the 
entire country, President Buyoya, a Tutsi Hima 
“did not hesitate a minute to admit his defeat and 
recognize the verdict of the ballot box”(30) Ndadaye 
not only became the first Hutu president, but won 
the first ever free and fair multiparty election in the 
history of Burundi. 
But no sooner had the results of the election been 
made public than thousands of Tutsi students and 
hardcore circles of the UPRONA political 
persuasion took to the streets to protest against 
what some referred to as an “ethnic census”. As if 
that was not enough outrage, some forty Tutsi 
troops of the Second Command Battalion, with a 
handful other officers staged an abortive coup 
d’etat on 2 July, attempting to seize power from 
Ndadaye. Ignoring the distraction, Ndadye went 
ahead to form his government, which comprised of 
7 Tutsi and 15 Hutu, with Sylvie Kinigi, a Tutsi as 
Prime Minister. On 10 July 1993 Ndadaye was 
formally inaugurated as the President of the 
Republic, bringing to an end a transition that began 
some four years earlier and equally bringing to a 
close (or so it seemed), nearly three decades of 
Tutsi hegemony. However, 3 months later, on 21 
October 1993, History came full circle – Ndadaye 
was assassinated by the Tutsi-dominated Burundi 
army. 
Genocide & Civil War, 1993 – 2005 
The assassination of President Ndadaye resulted to 
what is sometimes referred to as the genocide and 
civil war 1993 – 2005.  This was a decade of civil 
war that followed the assassination, as about 
300,000 people were killed in clashed and reprisals 
against the local population. It was in the midst of 
the civil war that an internal peace process started 
in June 1998. This was to prepare the ground for 
the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 
August 2000. This agreement, a major political 
breakthrough, one would say, involved nineteen 
political organizations and movements.
(31)
.  They 
included; (1) The government of the Republic of 
Burundi   (2) The National Assembly  (3) The 
Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut 
(ABASA)  (4) The Alliance National pour le Droit 
et le Developpment (ANADDE) (5) The Alliance 
des Vaillants (AV-INTWARI)  (6) The Conseil 
National pour la Defense De la Democratie 
(CNDD) (7) The Front pour la Democratie au 
Burundi (FRODEBU)  (8) The Front pour la 
Liberation Nationale (FROLINA)   (9) The Parti 
Socialiste et Panafricainste (INKN20),   (10) The 
Parti pour le Redressement National (PARENA)   
(11) The Parti Independent des Travailleurs  (PIT)   
(12) The Parti Liberal (PL)  (13) The Parti Du 
Peuple (PP)  (14) The Parti pour la Reconciliation 
du Peuple  (PRP)  (15) The Parti Social-
Democratie (PSD)  (16) The Relliement pour la 
Democratie et le Developpment Economique et 
Social (RADDES)  (17) The Rassemblement du 
Peuple Burundais (RPB)  (18) The Parti pour la 
Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) and  
(19) The Union pour le Progres National 
(UPRONA).  
The main parties to the talks that eventually 
produced the Peace Agreement were UPRONA, 
PRODEBU, the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU. It 
must be indicated that the political wing of the 
CNDD, as led by Leonard Nyangoma signed the 
Arusha agreement, the FDD refused to do so, 
declining the CNDD political leadership as 
illegitimate.
(32)
 It will be recalled that following 
Ndadaye’s assassination, his political party 
FRODEBU had splintered into the CNDD, and its 
armed wing, the FDD.
(33)
 The split eventually led to 
the formation of a more radical *CNDD – FDD. 
Under the leadership of Jean Bosco Ndayikengu - 
*rukiye, the CNDD FDD initially refused to 
participate in the Arusha Peace Agreement, 
alongside its equally radical rebel soul-mate – the 
FNL. The CNDD-FDD however finally signed the 
Peace Agreement in 2003, and joined the 
transitional government, the FNL continued its 
rebellion until 2006 when it signed a cease fine 
agreement. 
The Arusha Peace Agreement. 
Typifying the situation in Burundi as political 
conflict with important ethnic dimensions, the 
Arusha Agreement had, among other things the aim 
of developing a system of democratic governance 
for the country that would ensure the security of 
ethnic minorities.  The consociatiolist agreement 
was to ensure power-sharing at the political level 
by dividing executive powers between a president 
and two vice-presidents from different political 
parties and ethnic backgrounds.  It further required 
a high majority to pass legislation and amend the 
constitution.
(34)
  This provision was not only aimed 
at preventing legislative dominance by a single 
ethnic group, but also to promote dialogue and 
consensus across political divides. 
To promote power-sharing in the security sector, 
the agreement made provision for the various 
armed groups to be integrated into the existing 
army, and for the army not to comprise more than 
50 percent of a single ethnic group. This was to 
ensure ethnic balance that would in turn ensure 
stability in the armed forces, prevent ethnic 
violence and reduce the possibility of a coup 
d’etat.(44) Consequent upon this provision, the army 
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received an infusion of Hutu soldiers, thereby 
removing the previous dominance of the Tutsi elite. 
These changes have been captured in more graphic 
details. The Arusha Agreement established the 
principle of a 50-50 ethnic quota system for the 
new National Defense Force (NDF), in contrast to 
the old Armed Forces of Burundi (FAB), which 
was hitherto, almost exclusively Tutsi, despite the 
Hutu making up about 85 percent of the population. 
Besides, positions in the top ranks of the integrated 
military were split 60-40 between those from the 
old FAB Officer corps and their opposite numbers 
in command of the CNDD – FDD. This perhaps 
may account for the failure of the recent attempted 
coup d’etal that followed President Nkurunziza’s 
bid for a third term in office in 2015. 
In preparing the way for a new constitution and 
detailing the new transitional political arrangement, 
the Arusha agreement stipulated that the first post-
transitional president would be elected by the 
National Assembly.  It was under this framework 
that Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD – FDD was 
elected Burundi’s President in 2005, even when his 
party was not yet signatory to the Arusha 
agreement. 
Instrumentalism, Multiparysim And 
Consocialism 
As a theoretical model of analyzing conflict in 
plural African societies, the instrumentalist 
theorem remains relevant in understanding the 
conflict in Burundi, and other areas of the African 
Great Lakes. According to Bonny Ibhawoh, 
instrumentalism remains one of the three dominant 
typologies into which theories of ethnicity in Africa 
fall.
(45)
 The instrumentalist model is seen as a tool 
in the hands of both the colonial state and the post-
colonial elite in furthering their interests, especially 
politically. 
A cursory look at our analysis so far reveals that 
both the colonial Belgian authorities and their local 
nationalist counterparts in Burundi made use of the 
ethnic factor in mobilizing and galvanizing the 
local populace to support and participate in their 
various strategies to retain political power. Despite 
the zeal and ferocity with which these strategies 
have been pursued, the question remains, how have 
they helped in assuring the greatest good to the 
greatest number? Ethnicity may have helped the 
colonialists to manipulate and ensure the 
exploitation of both material and human resources 
in Burundi, in supporting one group, or the other as 
it suits their interests and persuasion, it may have 
helped the post-colonial local elite in sustaining 
social hatred in order to maintain social privileges, 
but how has all these helped the society to make 
progress? 
Multipartyism is both a hand-maid, and a counter 
to instrumentalism. Unlike its ethnic kin and ally to 
the south-Rwanda, Burundi acceded to 
independence in 1962, as a multiparty state.  It will 
be recalled that following WW II Ruanda - Urundi 
had become a United Nations Trust Territory under 
Belgiam administrative authority. By 10 November 
1959, Belgium, having committed, itself to political 
reform, legalized the emergence of competing 
political parties. Consequent upon this, two 
political parties emerged - the Union for National 
Progress (UPRONA), a multi ethnic party, led by 
Tutsi Prince Louis Rwagasore, and the Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC) supported by Belgium. 
Following the assassination of Prince Rwagasore, 
and the subsequent descent to ethnic conflict, as we 
have seen; a multiplicity of political parties 
emerged, to the end that on the heels of the 
inauguration of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation agreement, about 20 political 
organizations existed in Burundi. 
Conventional Wisdom dictates that in a situation 
where there are two dominant contending 
ethnicities for political power, this multiplicity of 
political platforms would have worked to avert 
inter-ethnic conflict and subsequent violence, or at 
least reduce it to manageable limits. This is more 
so when we see statecraft deliberately engineered 
to discourage ethnic based political parties from 
emerging, as Buyoya’s National Commission 
sought to entrench. In spite of these, conflict and 
violence seemed to escalate rather than reduce. 
What can be responsible for this state of affairs?  
This brings us to the consocialist model of power 
sharing. Since multpartyism and political 
engineering to discourage ethnic partisan political 
platforms could discourage ethnic violence, it was 
felt that only a deliberate power – sharing formular 
of the consociational model could guarantee inter-
ethnic harmony, and induce progress in the 
political economy of Burundi. The Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement was thus 
inaugurated to achieve that objective. But has the 
objective been achieved? 
Conclusion: 
This paper is of the opinion that so long as there is 
a lack of shared national vision of societal 
reconstruction and progress in Burundi, the 
undercurrent of ethnic conflict and violence will 
continue to fan the embers of hatred, distrust and 
mutual fears of annihilation by the two dominant 
ethnicities. The negotiations and political 
compromises upon which national decisions are 
made must take into consideration the fractured 
social fibre of the country, rather than focusing on 
group, individual, even egoistic gains and benefits. 
To avoid continued or renewed interethnic 
violence, people of all ethnic groups must develop 
a consciousness of the critical role they and groups 
must play in the peace building and social 
reconstruction processes. To this end, opportunities 
need to be afforded the people to share their 
narratives of war, to facilitate mutual understanding 
and compassion for one another.  This has been the 
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experience of deeply - divided societies where 
atrocities have been committed by one against the 
other. There must be some sort of platform of Truth 
and Reconciliation where one can say to the other: 
we are sorry for what has happened, and both can 
say to themselves: Never Again!            
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